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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






In re:  TRIBUNE COMPANY, et al.,  
Debtors 
 
DELAWARE TRUST COMPANY,  
as successor indenture trustee  
for certain series of Senior Notes and 
DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS, 
solely in its capacity as successor Indenture Trustee for 
certain series of Senior Notes, 
Appellants 
    
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 1-12-mc-00108, 1-12-cv-
00128/01072/1073/1100/1106) 
District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
 
 
Argued November 12, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 26, 2020) 
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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Many of the contentious battles in bankruptcy involve 
the allocation of distributions among similarly situated 
creditors.  We have such a battle here, where certain creditors 
of the Tribune Company, called the “Senior Noteholders,” 
claim Tribune’s plan of reorganization (the “Plan”) misapplies 
their rights under the Bankruptcy Code by not according them 
the full benefit of their subordination agreements with other 
Tribune creditors.  The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Plan 
over the Senior Noteholders’ dissenting votes.  In bankruptcy 
parlance, they were “crammed down.” 
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The provision in play was 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1), 
which provides (with explanatory annotations) as follows: 
Notwithstanding section 510(a) of this title 
[making subordination agreements enforceable 
in bankruptcy to the extent they would be in non-
bankruptcy law], if all of the applicable 
requirements of subsection (a) of this section 
[1129] other than paragraph (8) [for our 
purposes, this paragraph requires that each class 
of claims has accepted the plan] are met with 
respect to a plan, the court, on request of the 
proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan 
notwithstanding the requirements of such 
paragraph [8] if the plan does not discriminate 
unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to 
each class of claims or interests that is impaired 
under, and has not accepted, the plan. 
To unpack terms of art, “discriminate unfairly” is a horizontal 
comparative assessment applied to similarly situated creditors 
(here unsecured creditors) where a subset of those creditors is 
classified separately, does not accept the plan, and claims 
inequitable treatment under it.  Bruce A. Markell, A New 
Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 Am. 
Bankr. L.J. 227, 227–28 (1998).  “[F]air and equitable” (a 
redundant term) should be pictured vertically, as it “regulates 
priority among classes of creditors having higher and lower 
priorities,” id. at 228.  For example, secured creditors are a 
higher priority for payment than unsecured creditors.  For the 
sake of completeness, “impaired” means a creditor whose 
rights under a plan are altered (obviously adversely).  11 
U.S.C. § 1124(1).  
In our case, the Senior Noteholders were assigned their 
own class (1E) of unsecured creditors in Tribune’s Plan.  When 
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they did not accept the Plan but other classes did, the 
Bankruptcy Court confirmed it under the cramdown provision, 
and they became bound by it.  They appeal to us, contending 
that “[n]otwithstanding” in § 1129(b)(1) entitles them to their 
full recovery from the strict enforcement of the subordination 
agreements, and, in any event, the Plan’s proposed 
distributions were unfairly discriminatory in favor of another 
unsecured class (1F) that shared in the subordinated sums.   
We agree with the Bankruptcy and District Courts that 
the text of § 1129(b)(1) supplants strict enforcement of 
subordination agreements.  Instead, when cramdown plans 
play with subordinated sums, the comparison of similarly 
situated creditors is tested through a more flexible unfair-
discrimination standard.  Applying that standard here, we 
affirm the result determined by those Courts.  
The facts that follow, as typical in the transactional 
world, are complicated, and so at times is the legal analysis.  
Frame them, however, in the context set out above.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Prior to its bankruptcy, Tribune was the largest media 
conglomerate in the country, reaching 80% of American 
households each year.  It owned the Chicago Tribune and the 
Los Angeles Times, as well as many regional newspapers, 
television and radio stations.   
 The Company’s 2008 bankruptcy followed on the heels 
of its failed leveraged buyout (“LBO”),1 which left it with 
 
1 An LBO is typically a transaction where the purchaser 
acquires an entity with borrowings secured by the assets of that 




almost $13 billion of debt and a complex capital structure.  In 
2012, after years of contentious proceedings, the Bankruptcy 
Court confirmed the Plan over the dissenting votes of the 
Senior Noteholders.2  Initial distributions under the Plan were 
made at the end of that year, as the Bankruptcy Court rejected 
the Senior Noteholders’ request for a stay.  
 This is the second time Tribune’s dissenting creditors 
are before us.  In In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (“Tribune I”), we reversed in part the District 
Court’s determination that the Senior Noteholders’ claims 
were, because the Plan’s distributions had already occurred, 
equitably moot and sent them back for further proceedings on 
the merits.  On remand, that Court affirmed the Bankruptcy 
Court’s confirmation order over the Senior Noteholders’ 
objections.  In re Tribune Media Co., 587 B.R. 606 (D. Del. 
2018).  We review their appeal here.   
1. Overview of Tribune’s creditors  
Prior to the 2007 LBO, Tribune had a market 
capitalization of $8 billion and $5 billion in debt, which had 
been amassed over decades.  The Senior Noteholders loaned to 
Tribune unsecured debt between 1992 and 2005 (the “Senior 
 
purchaser put none of its own money at risk.  In re Tribune 
Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 
2 Appellants technically are the Delaware Trust 
Company and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (the 
“Trustees”), which, in their capacities as successor indenture 
trustees, represent the interest of the Senior Noteholders.  For 
simplicity, we refer throughout this opinion to the Senior 




Notes”).  Covenants in the Senior Notes’ indentures require 
that they are paid before any other debt incurred by the 
company.  When Tribune filed for reorganization, the 
outstanding amount due on those Notes was $1.283 billion.3   
In 1999, Tribune also issued $1.256 billion of unsecured 
exchangeable subordinated debentures (the “PHONES 
Notes”).  Their indenture provided that they are subordinate in 
payment to all “‘Senior Indebtedness’ of Tribune,” which 
included the Senior Notes.  In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 
138 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (the “2011 Opinion”).  At the time 
of its bankruptcy, the outstanding principal on the PHONES 
Notes was $759 million.   
The LBO added approximately $8 billion of debt to 
Tribune’s capital structure.  As part of the merger financing, 
Tribune issued $225 million of unsecured debt (the “EGI 
Notes”).  That indenture also subordinated repayment to 
“Senior Obligations.” 4  
Also among the billions of dollars of Tribune’s debt are 
an unsecured $150.9 million “Swap Claim” (which is tied to 
the termination of an interest rate swap agreement to offset the 
interest rate exposure from the LBO); $105 million of 
 
3 For consistency, we use the claim amounts from the 
Stipulated Recovery Percentage Table set out below.  
 
4  The Bankruptcy Court determined that the definition 
of “Senior Obligations” in the EGI Notes was broader than the 
definition of “Senior Indebtedness” in the PHONES Notes.  As 
any creditor determined to be Senior Indebtedness would also 
qualify as a Senior Obligation, for simplicity we refer to both 




unsecured claims by Tribune Media Retirees (the “Retirees”); 
and $8.8 million of unsecured claims by trade and 
miscellaneous creditors (the “Trade Creditors”).   
From Tribune’s perspective, these unsecured 
creditors—the holders of Senior Notes, the PHONES and EGI 
Notes, and Swap Claim, plus the Retirees and the Trade 
Creditors—are of equal priority.  But the subordination 
provisions in the PHONES and EGI Notes’ indentures—which 
were entered outside Tribune’s bankruptcy—limit their 
repayment until all Senior Obligations are paid in full. Thus, 
whether a creditor should benefit from these subordination 
provisions depends on its claim qualifying as a Senior 
Obligation.  
2. The Bankruptcy Court Proceedings  
During the bankruptcy proceedings, several groups of 
stakeholders proposed plans to reorganize Tribune’s debt.  The 
Bankruptcy Court’s 2011 Opinion on competing plans  
coalesced support around the Plan sponsored by Tribune, its 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and certain 
lenders.  It settled many of the Creditors’ Committee’s claims 
against the LBO lenders, directors and officers of the old 
Tribune, real estate investor Samuel Zell (who orchestrated the 
LBO5), and others, for $369 million paid to Tribune’s estate.   
 The Plan organized Tribune’s unsecured creditors into 
distinct classes.  The Senior Noteholders, which comprise 
 
5 Mr. Zell called it “the deal from hell.”  Michael Arndt 
and Emily Thornton, Sam Zell Speaks His Mind, Bloomberg 






Class 1E, argue that the Plan favored Class 1F, which is made 
up of the Swap Claim, the Retirees, and the Trade Creditors 
(collectively this class includes over 700 unsecured creditors).  
It paid both Class 1E and Class 1F creditors 33.6% of their 
outstanding claims from the initial distributions under the Plan.  
In re Tribune Co., 472 B.R. 223, 237 & n.17 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2012) (the “Allocation Opinion”).  These payments included 
monies from the subordination of the PHONES and EGI Notes. 
The Senior Noteholders objected to the Plan.  They 
argued that it allocated more than $30 million of their recovery 
from the subordinated PHONES and EGI Notes to Class 1F 
when only the Senior Noteholders in Class 1E qualified as 
Senior Obligations, and thus they alone should benefit from 
those subordination agreements.  Specifically, they asserted 
that the Plan violated the Bankruptcy Code’s standards for 
confirmation because it did not fully enforce the subordination 
provisions per § 510(a).  In the alternative, they claimed that 
the allocation of subordination payments to Class 1F unfairly 
discriminated against their Class 1E.   
To resolve these and other intercreditor claims, the 
Bankruptcy Court established an allocation dispute process, 
which called for extensive briefing followed by a hearing on 
the Senior Noteholders’ objections.  As a starting point, the 
creditors stipulated to their initial recovery percentages under 
the Plan depending on which creditors ultimately qualified as 
Senior Obligations under the PHONES and EGI indentures.  It 
was undisputed that the Class 1E Senior Notes were Senior 
Obligations and thus entitled to payments from the 
subordinated creditors.  A principal dispute concerned whether 
other creditors also qualified; if so, they would recover 
additional payment from the subordination provisions in the 
PHONES and EGI Notes.  Thus the Senior Noteholders stood 
to increase their recovery by limiting which, if any, other 




Allocation Opinion, 472 B.R. at 238 (describing recovery 
under the Plan); J.A. 327.6 
In its Allocation Opinion, the Bankruptcy Court 
determined that § 1129(b)(1) does not require that the 
subordination agreements be strictly enforced for a plan to be 
confirmed.  It also rejected the Senior Noteholders’ unfair-
discrimination claim, explaining that it failed even if the Court 
“assume[d] (without deciding) that[ ] none of the [Class 1F 
creditors] are Senior [Obligations] [ ] and are not entitled to the 
benefit of either subordination agreement.”  472 B.R at 238.  
However, it resolved in a footnote that the Swap Claim, which 
comprised 57% of Class 1F’s aggregate claims, was a Senior 
Obligation and thus should benefit from the partial 
enforcement of the subordination agreements.7  Id. at 238–39 
 
6 The parties stipulated that the Swap Claim would 
recover under the Plan 36.0% of its claim on J.A. 327.  
However, given descriptions of the Plan in the Bankruptcy 
Court’s Allocation Opinion and the parties’ briefs, this looks 
to be incorrect, see 472 B.R. at 238; Trustees’ Br. 39; Tribune’s 
Br. 3.  All Class 1E and 1F creditors, including the Swap 
Claim, appear to have recovered under the Plan 33.6% of their 
respective claims. 
 
7 The Senior Noteholders appealed this categorization 
of the Swap Claim to the District Court, which affirmed the 
Bankruptcy Court’s determination.  587 B.R. at 618–19.  They 




n.19.  Notably, the Court did not decide whether the Retirees’ 
claim qualified as a Senior Obligation.8  Id.   
The Court’s footnote stating that the Swap Claim 
qualified as a Senior Obligation reduced the Senior 
Noteholders’ unfair-discrimination claim of approximately 
$30 million by over $17 million, thereby leaving roughly $13 
million in dispute (a small sum relative to their overall $1.283 
billion claim).9  To put this in a picture, they ask us to reallocate 
payments to reflect the fourth row of the Stipulated Recovery 
Percentage Table (“If Class 1E and the Swap Claim benefit 
from subordination”) rather than the first row, increasing initial 
distributions toward their claim recovery from 33.6% to 
34.5%.10   
 
8 In their Brief to us, the Retirees contend that, should 
we not affirm and remand the case, this issue remains for 
determination.  Retirees’ Br. 14–15. Yet, they state two pages 
later that they “are not subject to the subordination 
agreements.”  Id. at 17.  Though this is ambiguous, we affirm 
the Bankruptcy and District Courts here, and thus we do not 
need to resolve this issue or remand for its resolution.  
 
9Aligning the Swap Claim with the same benefits 
accorded the Senior Noteholders begs us to ask whether it was 
misclassified by being assigned to Class 1F.  That is a good 
question, but no one teed it up for resolution on appeal.  Thus 
it is not before us.   
 
10 We, like the parties, stick with initial Plan 
distributions that do not include hypothetical future recoveries 
that may be gained by a litigation trust under the Plan.  
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3. The Senior Noteholders’ appeal  
The Senior Noteholders appealed the Plan’s 
confirmation to the District Court, renewing their argument 
that it violated § 1129(b)(1) by not exactly enforcing the 
subordination agreements.  In the alternative, they challenged 
the particulars of the Bankruptcy Court’s unfair-discrimination 
analysis, arguing that it erred, first, by including the recoveries 
due them from the subordination agreements in their Plan 
distributions, and second, by failing to compare their recovery 
under the Plan to that of Class 1F.   
While the appeal was pending, Tribune consummated 
the Plan by making the distributions called for in it.  We 
nonetheless held that the Senior Noteholders’ arguments 
before us now could proceed.11  Tribune 1, 799 F.3d at 283–
84.  They still came up short on remand, and appeal to us again. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 158(d) and 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s conclusions of law, including its interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  In re Goody’s Family Clothing Inc., 610 
F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Because the District Court sat 
as an appellate court to review the Bankruptcy Court, we 
review the [latter’s] legal determinations de novo, its factual 
 
11 In Tribune I we explained that, as payments under the 
Plan have already been distributed, if the Senior Noteholders 
(referred to there as the Trustees) are successful, their relevant 
relief, inter alia, is an increase in recovery payments through 
disgorgement “ordered against those Class 1F holders who 
have received more than their fair share.”  799 F.3d at 282–83.   
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findings for clear error, and its exercises of discretion for abuse 
thereof.”  Id.   
III. DISCUSSION 
Cramdown plans are an antidote to one or more classes 
of claims holding up confirmation of an otherwise consensual 
plan.  See generally Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to 
Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 
Am. Bankr. L.J. 133 (1979).  The cramdown provision in 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) waives § 1129(a)(8)’s mandate that all 
classes either vote to accept the plan or recover their debt in 
full under it.  Yet the provision also affords unique safeguards: 
the fair-and-equitable and unfair-discrimination standards.  
While we have spent considerable time outlining the 
boundaries of what is fair and equitable (as noted below, not at 
issue here), see, e.g., In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 
F.3d 507, 512–13 (3d Cir. 2005); In re PWS Holding Corp., 
228 F.3d 224, 237–42 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Bank of Am. 
Nat’l Tr. and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 
434, 444–49 (1999), the unfair-discrimination standard has 
received little analysis.       
A. Subsection 1129(b)(1) does not require 
subordination agreements to be enforced strictly.  
The Senior Noteholders first contend that the 
Bankruptcy Court should not have confirmed the Plan because 
it does not enforce strictly the PHONES and EGI Notes’ 
subordination agreements under Code § 510(a).  Thus we must 
determine the effect of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)’s explicit 
reference to the earlier provision.  Put another way, how does 
the cramdown provision’s authority interact with intercreditor 
subordination agreements?  
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 The Senior Noteholders argue § 1129(b)(1) “explain[s] 
that the cramdown safeguards must be applied 
‘[n]otwithstanding section 510(a),’” Trustees’ Br. 18 (quoting 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)), meaning that subordination 
agreements cannot be interfered with in cramdown cases.  Both 
the Bankruptcy and District Courts rejected this argument, 
explaining that it is at odds with the plain meaning of 
§ 1129(b)(1).  We agree.  
1. The text of § 1129(b)(1)  
Section 510(a) provides that “[a] subordination 
agreement is enforceable in [bankruptcy] to the same extent 
that such agreement is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”  But § 1129(b)(1) states that a 
nonconsensual plan may be confirmed “[n]otwithstanding 
section 510(a).” 
We have previously defined the phrase 
“notwithstanding” in the bankruptcy context to mean “‘in spite 
of’ or ‘without prevention or obstruction from or by.’”  
Goody’s, 610 F.3d at 817 (quoting Webster’s Third Int’l 
Dictionary 1545 (1971)); see also In re Federal-Mogul Global 
Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 369 (3d Cir. 2012) (reading the lead-in to 
Bankruptcy Code § 1123(a)—“notwithstanding any otherwise 
applicable non-bankruptcy law”—to mean that what follows in 
subsection (a) displaces conflicting state nonbankruptcy law).  
Although these cases interpret different sections of the Code, 
their analysis applies equally to § 1129(b)(1) because, 
“[p]resumptively, identical words used in different parts of the 
same act are intended to have the same meaning.”  U.S. Nat’l 
Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 
460 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Further, as we explained in Federal-Mogul, “[w]hen a federal 
law contains an express preemption clause, we focus on the 
plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best 
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evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.”  684 F.3d at 369 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Applying the lessons of Goody’s and Federal-Mogul 
here, § 1129(b)(1) overrides § 510(a) because that is the plain 
meaning of “[n]otwithstanding.”  Thus our holding becomes 
simple: Despite the rights conferred by § 510(a), “if all of the 
applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section [1129] 
. . . are met with respect to a plan, the court . . . shall confirm 
the plan . . . if [it] does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and 
equitable,” for each impaired class that does not accept the 
plan.   
2. The purpose of § 1129(b)(1)  
Section 1129(b)(1)’s purpose affirms this analysis.  The 
provision allows a court to confirm a plan if it protects the 
interests of a dissenting class, here the Class 1E Senior 
Noteholders.  Those interests are primarily preserved by the 
fair-and-equitable test (not in play here, as our dispute involves 
only unsecured creditors) and the unfair-discrimination test, 
the latter protecting the relative payments to same-rank 
creditor classes whose recovery has been affected, inter alia, 
by intercreditor subordination agreements.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(b)(1); Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 512; In re 
Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 589 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989).   
Both § 510(a) and the cramdown provision’s unfair-
discrimination test are concerned with distributions among 
creditors.  The first is by agreement, while the second tests, 
among other things, whether involuntary reallocations of 
subordinated sums under a plan unfairly discriminate against 
the dissenting class.  Only one can supersede, and that is the 
cramdown provision.  It provides the flexibility to negotiate a 
confirmable plan even when decades of accumulated debt and 
private ordering of payment priority have led to a complex web 
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of intercreditor rights.  It also attempts to ensure that debtors 
and courts do not have carte blanche to disregard pre-
bankruptcy contractual arrangements, while leaving play in the 
joints.12  
To date, we are aware of only one court that has spoken 
in a published opinion to the effect of § 1129(b)(1)’s 
notwithstanding proviso.  See In re TCI 2 Holdings, 428 B.R. 
117, 141 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (“The phrase ‘[n]otwithstanding 
section 510(a) of this title’ removes section 510(a) from the 
scope of 1129([b])(1)[.]”).  That decision aligns with ours here.  
The House Report for the Bankruptcy Code also 
supports this interpretation.  Though the Report’s discussion of 
unfair discrimination is quite brief, its examples exclusively 
involve the relative treatment of like-kind creditors affected by 
subordination agreements.  See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 416–
17 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6372–73 (the 
 
12 Further, as illustrated by the facts of this case, diverse 
groups—including former employees, trade creditors, and 
bondholders—typically make up a debtor’s unsecured 
creditors.  Agreements reached regarding repayment outside of 
the Chapter 11 context may no longer serve the creditors or the 
debtor “when each [creditor] does not contribute 
proportionately to [the reorganized debtor’s] creation and 
maintenance.”  7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.03 (16th ed. 
2020).  Thus the flexibility provided by the unfair-




“House Report”).  They rely on that discrimination principle, 
and not on § 510(a), to enforce subordination agreements.13  Id. 
To save their reading of § 1129(b)(1), the Senior 
Noteholders cite the 1995 article by Professor Kenneth Klee 
(one of the principal drafters of the Bankruptcy Code and, 
coincidentally, an examiner appointed by the Bankruptcy 
Court in this case) recommending that Congress delete the 
reference to § 510(a) in § 1129(b) to prevent the “anomalous 
result of overriding § 510(a) and eliminating the enforcement 
of subordination agreements in cases in which the class rejects 
the plan.”  Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine 
Tuning the Plan Process, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 551, 561 (1995).  
They urge that we adopt this recommendation to “avoid that 
bizarre result.”  Trustees’ Br. 29.  Their problem is that 
Professor Klee’s recommendation to Congress is not evidence 
of the legislature’s intent to favor § 510(a) (indeed, by 
inference he acknowledges that the cramdown provision 
prevails).  As Congress has not changed the law to reflect 
 
13 The Report’s discussion of unfair discrimination has 
received criticism over the years.  See In re Armstrong World 
Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 121 (D. Del. 2006) (“Unfair 
discrimination is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, nor does 
the statute’s legislative history provide guidance as to its 
interpretation.”); Markell, A New Perspective, supra, at 237–
38 (describing the examples of unfair discrimination in the 
legislative history as “roundabout, almost otiose”).  
Nevertheless, Professor (and former Judge) Markell relies on 
this legislative history to guide in part his analysis of the 
provision, ultimately arriving at the test used by the 
Bankruptcy Court here.  Id. at 236–38, 249–50.  We too find 
some guidance in the Report, even as we acknowledge that it 
is no model of clarity on our issue.   
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Professor Klee’s proposal, we rely on the plain language of 
§ 1129(b)(1). 
Hence we affirm the holding of the Bankruptcy and 
District Courts that subordination agreements need not be 
strictly enforced for a court to confirm a cramdown plan.  They 
correctly evaluated the Senior Noteholders’ claim under the 
unfair-discrimination test rather than a rigid application of 
§ 510(a).   
B. The Plan’s allocation of a small portion of 
subordinated sums to Class 1F creditors does not 
unfairly discriminate against the Senior 
Noteholders.  
As we resolved the first issue in favor of Tribune, we 
turn to the Senior Noteholders’ alternative argument:  The Plan 
unfairly discriminates against them.  The Bankruptcy Court’s 
unfair-discrimination analysis compared Class 1E’s initial 
distribution recovery percentage under the Plan—33.6%—to 
its recovery were there strict enforcement of the subordination 
agreements—34.5%—and determined that 0.9% was not a 
material difference in recovery.  Allocation Opinion, 472 B.R. 
at 243 n.21.  Thus it held there was no unfair discrimination to 
bar Plan confirmation. 
The Senior Noteholders allege two flaws in that 
analysis.  First, they claim the Court failed to compare only 
recoveries from the Tribune estate.  That is, it should have 
compared Class 1E’s and Class 1F’s Plan recoveries as if no 
subordination agreements were in effect.  As the parties 
stipulated in the Stipulated Percentage Recovery Table that the 
Senior Noteholders in Class 1E recovered only 21.9% of their 
claims absent subordination payments, this meant, they argue, 
that the rest of their 33.6% recovery under the Plan came from 
20 
 
the subordinated creditors and should be excluded from the 
unfair-discrimination analysis.   
Second, they claim that the Court’s refusal to compare 
their Class IE percentage recovery with Class 1F’s percentage 
recovery, and its decision to compare instead only Class 1E’s 
recovery under the Plan with its recovery had the subordination 
agreements been fully enforced, were incorrect.  Once these 
errors are addressed, they assert the difference between Class 
1E’s recovery under the Plan absent subordination (21.9%), 
and the Plan recovery of Class 1F’s non-Swap Claim creditors 
including subordination benefits (33.6%), is material, 
evidencing unfair discrimination that should have prevented 
the Plan’s confirmation.  
The Bankruptcy Code does not define unfair 
discrimination.  It “is something of an orphan in Chapter 11 
reorganization practice. . . . [J]ust what suffices to avoid unfair 
discrimination is uncertain.”  Markell, A New Perspective, 
supra, at 227.  “Generally speaking, this standard ensures that 
a dissenting class will receive relative value equal to the value 
given to all other similarly situated classes.”  In re Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 121 (D. Del. 2006) (quoting 
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 636 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1986)).  Since unfair discrimination’s inclusion in the 
Bankruptcy Code (it appeared for a short time in the 1930s in 
revisions to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898), courts have relied 
primarily on one of four tests to determine what unfairness 
means and, in some of those tests, whether, if a presumption of 
unfairness exists, it can be rebutted.  See generally Denise R. 
Polivy, Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11: A 
Comprehensive Compilation of Current Case Law, 72 Am. 
Bankr. L.J. 191, 196–208 (1998) (collecting and discussing 
cases applying the various tests).  
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The “mechanical” test prohibits all discrimination, that 
is, it requires that similarly situated creditors’ recoveries be 
100% pro rata.  See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 
560, 571–72 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (reasoning that paying 
the trade creditors a higher percentage of their claims than 
other unsecured creditors would constitute unfair 
discrimination), rev’d on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1274 (5th 
Cir. 1992).  The “restrictive” approach narrowly defines unfair 
discrimination such that, “[i]n the absence of subordination, . . 
. no disparate treatment of similarly situated creators would 
qualify,” Polivy, supra, at 200.  Both tests have support in the 
House Report: it noted “there is no unfair discrimination as 
long as the total consideration given all other classes of equal 
rank does not exceed the amount that would result from an 
exact aliquot distribution,” House Report, supra, at 416, and 
the examples given involved subordinated creditors, id. at 416–
17; see also In re Acequia, Inc., 787 F.2d 1352, 1364 & n.18 
(9th Cir. 1986).  Neither of these tests appears to be widely 
adopted, however.  See Polivy, supra, at 200–201 (collecting 
cases); cf. Aztec, 107 B.R. at 588–89 (rejecting both the 
restrictive and mechanical tests). 
The “broad” approach is generally applied as a four-
factor test that originated in the Chapter 13 case In re Kovich, 
4 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).  To determine 
whether the plan unfairly discriminates, the test considers 
whether: (1) a reasonable basis for discrimination exists; (2) 
the debtor cannot consummate its plan without discrimination; 
(3) the discrimination is imposed in good faith; and (4) the 
degree of discrimination is directly proportional to its 
rationale.14  See, e.g., Aztec, 107 B.R. at 590 (laying out and 
 
14 Some courts, finding the factors redundant, pared 




applying the test).  Although this analysis has received 
criticism, see, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 696, 
702 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999); In re Brown, 152 B.R. 232, 235 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
McCullough v. Brown, 162 B.R. 506 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Markell, 
A New Perspective, supra, at 242–48, 254–55, it has been 
applied often, see Polivy, supra, at 203 n.102 (collecting cases 
applying the broad test).15  
In response to criticisms of these tests, Professor Bruce 
Markell proposed the “rebuttable presumption” test, which was 
applied by the Bankruptcy Court in this case, 472 B.R. at 242.16  
 
basis for discrimination” and if it is “necessary for the 
reorganization.”  In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 696, 701 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (citation omitted).   
 
15 These critics reject the application of the broad test 
because, among other things, it was developed for Chapter 13 
cases, which require the protection of all creditors, as they do 
not have voting rights, and provides amorphous limits on 
discrimination.  Dow Corning, 244 B.R. at 702.  The rebuttable 
presumption test, dealt with below and developed for the 
Chapter 11 context, is tailored to the specific circumstances of 
cramdown, where only the interest of the dissenting class is at 
issue.  Id.  It also eschews concepts such as reasonableness, 
whether a plan can be confirmed without discrimination, and 
good faith.  
 
16 This holding is not before us, as the Senior 
Noteholders endorse it, Trustees’ Br. 37.  Tribune accepts it, 
Tribune’s Br. 17, as do we.  See In re Tribune Media Co., 587 
B.R. at 617–18; see also In re Nuverra Envtl. Sols., Inc., 590 
B.R. 75, 90 (D. Del. 2018). 
23 
 
A rebuttable presumption of unfair discrimination exists when 
there is  
(1) a dissenting class; (2) another class of the 
same priority; and (3) a difference in the plan’s 
treatment of the two classes that results in either 
(a) a materially lower percentage recovery for 
the dissenting class (measured in terms of the net 
present value of all payments), or (b) regardless 
of percentage recovery, an allocation under the 
plan of materially greater risk to the dissenting 
class in connection with its proposed 
distribution. 
Markell, A New Perspective, supra, at 228, 249; see also Dow 
Corning, 244 B.R. at 702. 
Under this test, a presumption of unfair discrimination 
may be overcome if the court finds that 
a lower recovery for the dissenting class is 
consistent with the results that would obtain 
outside of bankruptcy, or that a greater recovery 
for the other class is offset by contributions from 
that class to the reorganization.  The presumption 
of unfairness based on differing risks may be 
overcome by a showing that the risks are 
allocated in a manner consistent with the 
prebankruptcy expectations of the parties.  
Markell, A New Perspective, supra, at 228; cf. Comm. on 
Bankr. and Corp. Reorg. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of 
New York, Making the Test for Unfair Discrimination More 
“Fair”: A Proposal, 58 Bus. Law. 83, 106–07 (2002) 
(proposing amendments to this test that narrow the 
24 
 
circumstances where it is appropriate to overcome the 
presumption of unfair discrimination).   
The Senior Noteholders’ unfair-discrimination claim 
involves mixed questions of law and facts.  A bankruptcy 
court’s initial determination of which test to use is reviewed as 
“a legal conclusion without the slightest deference.”  U.S. Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at 
Lakeridge LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 965 (2018).  Reviewing the 
Bankruptcy Court’s choice of legal test de novo, we agree that 
it was appropriate in these circumstances to take a pragmatic 
approach to measure the Plan’s discrimination.  Thereafter, 
Village at Lakeridge asks whether applying the law to the facts 
“entails primarily legal or factual work.”  Id. at 967.  This 
inquiry sounds simple, but often it will depend on how a court 
approaches its analysis.  Our approach here sets up a fact-
specific question: How does discrimination affect Class 1E’s 
actual recovery?  Thus we review the application of legal 
precepts to the facts in this instance for clear error.  (Even were 
we instead to apply de novo review, the result would not 
change).   
1. Principles framing the “unfair-discrimination” 
standard  
We distill the following principles from the various 
unfair-discrimination analyses.    
First, though § 1129(b)(1)’s legislative history speaks 
of discrimination as unfair once there is breached a pure pro 
rata division of plan distributions among like-priority 
creditors, that runs counter to the text.  See Aztec, 107 B.R. at 
588–89.  “Discriminate unfairly” is simple and direct: you can 
treat differently (discriminate) but not so much as to be unfair.  
There is, as is typical in reorganizations, a need for flexibility 
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over precision.  The test becomes one of reason circumscribed 
so as not to run rampant over creditors’ rights.   
This reading is also consistent with our holding in 
Section A above.  A subordination agreement does not need to 
be enforced to the letter in the case of a cramdown, and 
subordinated amounts may be allocated to other classes not 
entitled outside bankruptcy to benefit from subordination 
agreements as long as that allocation is not presumptively 
unfair (and, if so, the presumption is not rebutted). 
Second, the cramdown provision’s text also makes plain 
that unfair discrimination applies only to classes of creditors 
(not the individual creditors that comprise them), and then only 
to classes that dissent.  Thus a disapproving creditor within a 
class that approves a plan cannot claim unfair discrimination, 
and the standard does not “apply directly with respect to other 
classes unless they too have dissented.”  Klee, Cram Down, 
supra, at 141 n.67. 
Third, unfair discrimination is determined from the 
perspective of the dissenting class.  House Report, supra, at 
416–17.  What this means, however, is subject to 
interpretation.  Courts and commentators nearly always 
consider this a comparison between the allegedly preferred 
class and the dissenting class.  See, e.g., In re Greate Bay Hotel 
& Casino, Inc., 251 B.R. 213, 231 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000) 
(collecting cases comparing the recovery of the dissenting 
class to that of the preferred class or classes); Klee, Cram 
Down, supra, at 142 (“[I]f the plan protects the legal rights of 
a dissenting class in a manner consistent with the treatment of 
other classes . . . , then the plan does not discriminate unfairly 
with respect to the dissenting class.”).  However, as was done 
in this case, a court may in certain circumstances consider the 
difference between what the dissenting class argues it is 
entitled to recover and what it actually received under the plan.  
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In other words, a comparison between the recovery of the 
preferred class and the dissenting class is by far the preferred 
but not always the only acceptable approach.  Other measures 
that allow courts to assess the magnitude of harm to the 
dissenting class may also be appropriate in some cases. 
Fourth, the need for classes to be aligned correctly is a 
precursor to an effective assessment.  A typical refrain in 
bankruptcy is that many plan disputes in § 1129 begin as 
misclassifications under § 1122.17  See, e.g.,  In re Woodbridge 
Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 317–321 (7th Cir. 1994) (considering 
both the dissenting creditors’ misclassification and unfair-
discrimination claims); In re Unbreakable Nation Co., 437 
B.R. 189, 200–202 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (same); Greate Bay 
Hotel, 251 B.R. at 223–32 (same); see generally G. Eric 
Brunstad, Jr. and Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and 
the Unresolved Doctrines of Classification and Unfair 
Discrimination in Business Reorganizations Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, 55 Bus. Law. 1, 72–73 & n.289, 78 (1999) 
(discussing the need to enforce subordination principles at 
classification to avoid “perverse incentives” and unfair-
discrimination claims).   
 
17 Technically a plan objection, if made, would be under 
§ 1129(a) by claiming that the plan did not comply with the 
classification requirements of § 1122(a), which requires that 
“substantially similar” claims be placed in the same class.  
Markell, A New Perspective, supra, at 238 n.56. Where 
subordination agreements are in play, a gateway to unfair-
discrimination determinations is to separate those whose 
claims benefit from the agreements from those who do not.  
Placing a subordination beneficiary with a non-beneficiary in 
a single class bleeds over clear analysis. 
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Fifth, courts should resolve how a plan proposes to pay 
each creditor’s recovery “measured in terms of the net present 
value of all payments” or the “allocation . . . of materially 
greater risk . . . in connection with its proposed distribution.”  
Markell, A New Perspective, supra, at 228.  This allows future 
distributions to be made reasonably equivalent to the actual 
value distributed at the time of the unfair-discrimination 
comparison. 
Sixth, in making an unfair-discrimination 
determination, start by adding up all proposed plan 
distributions from the debtor’s estate and divide by the number 
of creditors sharing the same priority.  This provides a pro rata 
baseline.  Then look at what actually happens if the plan is 
implemented.  Where there are no subordination agreements 
involved, the analysis is simple: look at the difference between 
the recovery percentage under the plan of a preferred class and 
that of a dissenting class.  Where subordination agreements are 
involved, courts should resolve in the first instance which 
creditors are entitled to benefit from those agreements.  They 
should make their comparisons after including subordinated 
sums in the plan distributions, for what may be in dispute often 
is the amount the dissenting class would be entitled under full 
enforcement of § 510(a) but did not get under the plan. 
Seventh, to presume unfair discrimination, there must 
be “a ‘materially lower’ percentage recovery for the dissenting 
class or a ‘materially greater risk to the dissenting class in 
connection with its proposed distribution.’”  Greate Bay Hotel, 
251 B. R. at 229 (quoting Dow Corning, 244 B.R. at 702).  The 
rebuttable presumption test intentionally leaves opaque what 
is, under the circumstances, “material.”  Such line drawing has 
been left primarily to bankruptcy courts.  See Bruce A. 
Markell, Slouching Toward Fairness: A Reply to the ABCNY’s 
Proposal on Unfair Discrimination, 58 Bus. Law. 109, 116 
(2002) (“Congress has left the important area of nonconsensual 
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confirmation to the common law method of incremental 
decision-making.”).  We too leave this for judicial 
development. 
Eighth, if courts find plans materially discriminate 
against the dissenting class and follow the rebuttable 
presumption test or some variation, that finding is by definition 
presumptive and can be rebutted.  Though we could make 
general suggestions for what qualifies as an adequate rebuttal 
(e.g., contributions to the reorganization by a preferred class 
may rebut unfair discrimination), those determinations are for 
bankruptcy courts to decide initially.  Id.  
2. Application of the principles  
To review, the Bankruptcy Court compared Class 1E’s 
recovery under the Plan (33.6%) to its recovery if it and the 
Swap Claim were the only creditors to benefit from the 
subordination agreements (34.5%).  472 B.R. at 243 n.21.  The 
Senior Noteholders point out that typically a court will 
compare the recovery percentages of the dissenting and 
preferred classes and ask whether the difference in recovery, if 
any, is material.  Trustees’ Br. 41.  If that analysis had been 
applied here, the Court would have needed to resolve the 
relative priority of all the creditors in Classes 1E and 1F to 
determine which creditors qualified as Senior Obligations 
under the PHONE and EGI Notes before comparing the 
treatment of the two classes under the Plan.   
Yet neither the text of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) nor the 
rebuttable presumption test explicitly limits the unfair-
discrimination analysis to only a class-to-class comparison.  As 
the Bankruptcy Court noted, unfair discrimination requires that 
a court evaluate whether “there was a materially lower 
percentage recovery for the dissenting class.”  472 B.R. at 244 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Greate Bay Hotel, 
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251 B.R. at 231).  In cases where a class-to-class comparison 
is difficult—for instance, here 57% of Class 1F (the Swap 
Claim) is entitled to benefit from the subordination of the 
PHONES and EGI Notes, while the Trade Creditors (and 
perhaps the Retirees) are not—a court may opt to be pragmatic 
and look to the discrepancy between the dissenting class’s 
desired and actual recovery to gauge the degree of its different 
treatment.  Either way the perspective remains that of the 
dissenting class.  
The Senior Noteholders argue that the Court should 
have compared their recovery from the estate absent 
subordination (21.9%) to the Trade Creditors’ recovery under 
the Plan with the reallocated subordination payments (33.6%).  
To measure discrimination this way is to ignore that the Plan 
brought into the Tribune estate not only the subordinated sums 
distributed to non-beneficiaries of that subordination, but all 
payments from the subordinated creditors (and indeed it 
allocated the overwhelming majority of those sums to the 
Senior Noteholders and the Swap Claim).   
In this context, the Bankruptcy Court did not necessarily 
err when it compared the Senior Noteholders’ desired recovery 
under the fourth row of the Stipulated Recovery Percentage 
Table (34.5%) to their actual recovery under the Plan (33.6%).  
To repeat, this is not the preferred way to test whether the 
allocation of subordinated amounts under a plan to initially 
non-benefitted creditors unfairly discriminates.  It may, 
however, be an appropriate metric (or cross-check) given the 
circumstances of a case.   
This is such a case.  Because the claims of the Retirees 
($105M) and Trade Creditors ($8.8M) are so substantially 
smaller than the Senior Noteholders’ claims ($1.283B), the 
increases in the recovery percentage for the Retirees’ and 
Trade Creditors’ claims from reallocated subordinated 
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amounts result in only a minimal reduction of the recovery 
percentage for the Senior Noteholders.  Specifically, the 
subordinated sums allocated to the Retirees and Trade 
Creditors comprised 11.7 percentage points toward their 33.6 
percentage recovery, but only reduced the Senior Noteholders’ 
recovery by nine-tenths of a percent.  Thus we agree with the 
Bankruptcy and District Courts that this difference in the 
Senior Noteholders’ recovery is not material.  Although the 
Plan discriminates, it is not presumptively unfair when 
understood, as ruled above, that a cramdown plan may 
reallocate some of the subordinated sums.   
As an aside, we note that the Bankruptcy Court looked 
to cases comparing the differences in the dissenting class and 
the preferred class recoveries as a baseline for its materiality 
determination.  See Allocation Opinion, 472 B.R. at 243 
(collecting cases).  Because it adopted a different framework 
for its analysis than the courts it cited, id. at 242–43, it did not 
need to apply their metric for materiality.  What constitutes a 
material difference in recovery when analyzing the effect of a 
plan on the dissenting class is a distinct and context-specific 
inquiry.  We do not address the outer boundary of that inquiry 
here.  Wherever it may lie, the nine-tenths of a percentage point 
difference in the Senior Noteholders’ recovery is, without a 
doubt, not material.  
* * * * * 
Unfair discrimination is rough justice.  It exemplifies 
the Code’s tendency to replace stringent requirements with 
more flexible tests that increase the likelihood that a plan can 
be negotiated and confirmed.  This flexibility is balanced by 
the Code’s inherent concern with equality of treatment.  We 
seek to maintain this balance in our interpretation of 
§ 1129(b)(1) here.   
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The Code does not compel courts reviewing cramdown 
plans to enforce subordination agreements strictly, though not 
to do so must conform with the constraints set out in the 
cramdown provision.  The pragmatic approach taken by the 
Bankruptcy Court, affirmed by the District Court, reached the 
right result.  Thus we also affirm.  
